therefore, towards such preliminaiy definition, discrimination and correlation of problems that I shall attempt to contribute. While opinions on certain of the issues mentioned will be expressed, it must be with the brevity that is indistinguishable from dogmatism ; and the chief purpose of this paper is simply to offer some prolegomena to any future discussion of ' emergence/ What is chiefly needed, however, is not an extreme narrowing of the signification of the general term.
In this case, as often in philosophy, it is better to leave to the generic term a meaning so broad as to appear vague, and to approach precise definitions and clear-cut issues by progressively distinguishing species within the genus.
' Emergence,' then, may be taken loosely to signify any augmentative or transmutative event, any process in which there appear effects that, in some one or more of several ways yet to be specifled, fail to conform to the maxim that ' there cannot be in the consequent anything more than, or different in nature from, that which is in the antecedent. ' And the first distinction which it is essential to make, in reducing this vague general notion to something more definite and discussable, is that between what I shall call the theses of (a) the possibility of general or absolute, and (b) the actuality of specific or empirical, emergence, theses antithetic respectively to the first and second sorts of causal preformationism.
To affirm the possibility of general emergence is to reject the pre?
formationist assumption formally and completely, and therefore to deny the validity of any argument from it to the existence of a metempirical cause or causes which somehow pre-contain ' all that is in the effects.' But to many this assumption apparently still has the force of an axiom, and the argument in question therefore figures conspicuously in some recent discussions of our theme. effects is declared to be precontained must be one of three things : a temporal prius, or an eternal which contains the temporal effects as its parts, or an eternal extraneous to those effects.
If taken in the first of these senses the assumption on which the argument rests cannot, of course, mean that the effects themselves are in the cause; it can only mean either (a) that the effects collectively do not differ either qualitatively or quantitatively from the prius?that is to say, that they are either mere repetitions of it, or else that they differ only in some relational property which is regarded as unimportant, such as the arrangement or distribution of the qualities and components present in the cause ; or (b) that they are never of higher metaphysical rank or excellence than the cause.
This latter is what the supposed axiom seems often to reduce to; the ' lower,' we are told, can come from the ' higher,' but not the ' higher ' from the ' lower'; the stream of being cannot rise higher than its source.
But?though this will seem to some a hard saying?neither of these ways of applying the preformationist assumption to temporal relations of cause and effect appears to be justified by anything better than a prejudice?an idol of the tribe, at best. The supposed axiom lacks self-evidence, and though there are some, there are no cogent, reasons for postulating it. It is entirely conceivable that temporal reality as a whole is not only augmented but attains higher levels within any finite time which we may choose to consider; and there are some to whom this evidently seems the more satisfying thing to postulate. Certainly, if consistently carried out, metaphysical preformationism has less edifying and cheering implications than are sometimes attributed to it.
If the sum of being and the sum of realized value are constant * J. E. Boodin, op. cit. (1925), pp. 9, 44, 67, 82, 96-8, 101 , and passim.
AND ITS MODES
?and unless they are either constant or diminishing the assumed axiom is false, and there is absolute emergence?then the whole movement and travail of the creation is but a barren shufflingabout of the same pieces ; an increase or ascent in one region must be simultaneously compensated by an equivalent decrease or decline elsewhere; the more the universe changes, the more it is the same thing.
If, however, the ' cause ' is conceived as a supratemporal totality which contains the temporal ' effects,' the impossibility of general emergence undeniably follows; an ' eternal' cannot grow or improve. But such a conception implies the true inclusion of a real succession in a totum simul; and no ingenuity has ever succeeded in showing this to be other than a self-contradiction. And this aside, since the temporal world is still admitted to be in some sense real, the whole of that world may, so far as the argument shows, conceivably differ at different moments in the number of its elements or in their value.
Finally, if the Cause by which ' all that is in the effects ' is said to be possessed is conceived as an eternal that does not contain these effects within its being?
which I take to be the orthodox Scholastic view?the same diffi?
culties present themselves as in the first case, together with some additional ones. The notion of an existent which at once is alien to all succession or change, and yet is the efficient cause of a series of temporal changes, is, to say the least, somewhat elusive ; and the supposition that that cause must ' possess' all that is in the temporal effects seems not only gratuitous?the same venerable prejudice as before?but also self-contradictory. None of their distinctive qualities can be predicable of it, except in a sense so ' eminent' as to be no sense at all.
And even if the qualities were the same, their ' communication' to the effects would mean the emergence of additional existent instances of those qualities, unless the qualities were at the same time lost by the Cause. And in any case, there is nothing in this last form of the argument which would preclude emergence on the side of the temporal beings; and this, as before, would necessarily mean an augmentation and enrichment of the general sum of things. There is, then, no valid a priori argument against the possibility of general (which, of course, does not necessarily mean perpetual) emergence to be drawn from the notion of causality.
The subject is one on which we have no means of arriving at objective conclusions, unless it be through more or less probable inference from experience. (2) admitting that E has the characters attributed to it by the assertor of emergence, he may maintain that these characters must be read back into the earlier phase?in other words, be supposed to be present in all phases?of the process.
The general logical nature of the problem being thus formulated, we may consider a particular hypothesis of existential emergence, which I believe to be true.
It is nowise original, being approxi?
mately the same as the theory to which Broad has given the name of ' emergent materialism'?though that designation seems to me a veritable lucus a non lucendo.
According to this hypothesis, both the third and fourth modes of emergence?i.e., emergent types of entities and emergent kinds of event or process?have appeared in evolution, and continue at present to recur, in the form, but only in the form, of what may be called ' transphysical' emergence.
By this I mean the production, as effects of the formation of certain complex and late-evolved integrations of living matter when acted upon by certain forms of radiant energy, of psychical events and psychical objects. An example of a psychical event is an act of awareness.
By psychical objects I mean individual entities empirically existent, having extension and certain other of the properties commonly called physical, but differing from true physical objects in that they do not conform to the laws of physics, have individually only an ephemeral existence, have collectively no quantitative or numerical constancy, have no direct dynamical relations with one another, and are grouped into ' private ' sets, i.e. each is directly accessible only to an act of awareness of an individual organism.
Examples of such entities are sensa and images, both delusive and veridical.
In other words, the " generative theory of sensa,"
recently defended by a number of writers, is a part of the hypothesis of emergent evolution I am presenting. The initial cases of transphysical emergence were followed by a further evolution of the same type, conditioned upon the formation of new and still more complex integrations of matter and (or) energy, and the process thus far apparently culminates in the cognitive and affective functions of the human organism.
To the plain man, and to some men of science, these theses will, I dare say, seem rather obvious, and not much in need of defence.
But in philosophy they manifestly raise numerous highly controversial issues. The existential emergence they assert is attacked chiefly from two sides, and by the two methods already defined; the reductive method is at present represented by behaviourism, the retrotensive mainly by panpsychism, or the mind-stuff theory. The behaviouristic argument I shall not here examine ; the view that both the act and the content of awareness, when I apprehend an object distant in space or time, are adequately describable as present changes of the relative position of molecules under my skin, really seems to me to be itself adequately describable by Broad's epithet, ' silly.' There is, however, an important con?
temporary doctrine which would apply the reductive method to the immediate objects of awareness, but not to the act of aware? ness ; the former, it declares, are simply parts of the physical world, and, if emergent at all, are not transphysical emergents. This contention is assuredly deserving of serious discussion ; but the reasons for rejecting it are too complex to be presented here.
The attempts of panpsychists to escape from the admission of transphysical emergence seem plainly to be due, in part, to the influence of an attenuated, vestigial form of the ancient pseudoaxiom mentioned at the outset; while it is not necessarily main?
tained by them that specific emergence is impossible in principle or non-existent in fact, they appear to feel that a causal antecedent cannot be so very different in nature from its effect as a physical event is from a mental one.
Thus the author of a recent admirably lucid defence of the mind-stuff theory remarks that " discon? tinuity in evolution would be a baffling and unintelligible pheno? menon," and declares that the mind-stuff theory alone " gives us a universe without such unintelligible breaches." " If a mind is simply a brain regarded from the outside . . . the gradual evolu? tion of a brain is the gradual evolution of a mind " ; thus " there is no need to postulate any discontinuity in evolution to account for the appearance upon the scene of minds, of consciousness, of qualities." Yet the same writer tells us that " the units " of mind-stuff " which make up our mental states " and also our Nor do they possess any of (at least) the secondary qualities. It is only when, " as a product of organic evolution," brains are formed, that " awareness," and therewith qualities, make their appearance.1 This, however, is to strain at an emergent gnat and swallow an emergent camel.
The state of being aware, and the cognition of external objects thereby eventually achieved, are not describable as the sum of the atomic, non-cognitive sentiencies supposed to inhere in the component particles of the brain ; and they are therefore no more " accounted for " by the assumed sentiency of those particles than by their motion.
They are as blankly different and discontinuous new facts as anything could be.
Little, manifestly, can be accomplished in this way to save a residuum of causal preformationism. Another attempt to employ the retrotensive method for avoiding the admission of transphysical emergence is to be seen in the parallelistic form of emergent evolutionism, the view that emergence occurs (in just what modes is not very clear) in the physical as well as in the psychical series, but in each independently.
Such a view, however, appears to involve the general doctrine, at once confused and incredible, that physical events can have no causal relation to mental ones?which implies that sensations are not due to physical stimuli, and that if a man, after receiving a blow on the head, loses his memory, the blow is wholly irrelevant to the amnesia.
This doctrine does not appear to me to lie within the bounds of serious discussion. The retrotensive method, therefore, not only gratuitously extends to the whole of nature a concomi?
tance for which there is probable evidence only in a special class of cases ; it also either falls far short of its objective or else leads to impossible implications. It remains to consider, before concluding, the ulterior philo? sophical consequences of any theory of emergent evolution which, like that outlined, purports to rest upon empirical grounds.
Supposing such a hypothesis true, what, if anything, does it imply with respect to the question which is at the heart of the philosophy of religion?the question of the relation of facts to values, of the real world to man's hopes and ideals ? Does any special significance attach to the fact that certain emergents appear gradually in the course of planetary history, that there seems to be a sort of orthogenesis in transphysical emergence, and that the types of entity and event which we are accustomed to place highest in the scale only for a single satellite of a minor star belonging to a " system of some 1,500 million or so of stars," which is only one of at least a million such systems.
That the higher emergents are to be found at all beyond this planet, we have no direct evi?
dence ; and there are definite astro-physical and bio-chemical reasons which make it seem probable that these emergents are, at all events, unusual in time and space.1 Even where life and intelligence appear, their presence is, if we may judge by our own system, but an episode ; they come late and probably leave early. The tendency to integration, the " holistic nisus " which General
Smuts sees " arising like a living fountain from the very depths of the universe " as " the guarantee that failure does not await us,"
is, so far as our vision reaches, forever accompanied by its antithesis, the tendency to dissolution and diffusion.
There is, then, nothing in any empirically grounded hypothesis i Cf. e.g., Jeans, in Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge, pp. 28-9, and Perrier, La Terre avant I'histoire, r92o, pp. 64~8r.
Since the above was written, the point has been more fully argued by Jeans in Nature, December 4, 1926, Supplement, p. 40 ledge which we possess concerning evolution justifies that generalized or cosmic meliorism which now so frequently does duty for a religion, there nevertheless lies before our terrestrial race in its little corner of the world a future which, if dim with uncertainties and beset with perils, is not necessarily devoid of possibilities immeasurably transcending all that the past has brought forth.
There perhaps yet remain to mankind, we are told, some thousand million years; if it be so, before that long day ends it is possible that, besides all that man's labouring reason may accomplish,
there may yet emerge out of the latent generative potencies of matter, as there quite certainly have emerged before in our strange planetary history, new and richer forms of being, such as no prescience of ours could foresee and no contrivance of ours create.
